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Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk

Abstract

Borrowing by the less-developed countries on private international credit
markets leads to market outcomes which constrast significantly with those
observed in corporate finance and lending between developed nations.

This

paper relates the unenforceability of bond covenants internationally to
asymmetries of information between debtors and creditors about the concurrent
indebtedness of borrowers.

These asymmetries of information in a model of

lending with moral hazard are shown to imply the observed short naturity
structure of debt, predominance of bank over bond lendirg, quan:ity rationing
of credit, and exclusion of the lowest income LDCs from the private
international capital market.

Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk*
1.

Introduc tion
The dramatic rise in the amount and extent of private lending to the

less-dev eloped·c ountries following 1973 has received widespread attentio n.
During the current recessio n, the Western press has often rep'orted that
creditor s were unaware of the total amount of lending to individu al LDCs,
thereby incorrec tly assessin g the risk of default •. This paper presents a
theoreti cal model of internat ional lending with sovereig n risk which
emphasizes the role of asymmetric information about total debt-ser vi~e
obligati ons between creditor s and debtors.

The model is used to explain how

sovereig n risk leads to important special features observed in LDC
borrowing.
The chara'ct eristics of borrowing by the LDCs on internat ional capital
markets have been investig ated and describe d in several recent st~dies (see,
for example, Eaton and Gersovit z (1981b), Fleming (1981), Hope (1981), IMF
(1981 and 1980), O'Brien {1981), and Wellons (1977)).

Eaton and GersoYitz

(1981b), in particu lar, argue that the threat of possible repudiat ion of deht
by a sovereign country is responsi ble for the salient differen ces between
market outcomes for LDC borrowing and the nature of loan contrac ts observed in
lending between developed nations and in do~estic corpora te finance. Access
to long-ter ~ loans on the Eurobond market is limited to very few non-OPEC
LDCs, and most LDCs which receive loans on the private credit market obtain
medium-term commercial credit from the major U.S. and European banks.
Therefo re, LDC debt is typicall y of shorter maturity than most developed
country corpora te debt.

The lowest income LDCs almost never gain access to

the private loan market and rely upon long-term borrowing from official
creditor s and internat ional agencies .

Private creditor s are also reported to

*The author is grateful to Pranab Bardhan for his encourag ement and manv valuable
suggesti ons; hwever , the author is solely respons ible for all remainin g errors.
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analyze individual countries' credit-worthiness, that is, their ability, or
proclivity, to absorb capital inflows and repay debts.

Therefore, the

adoption of policies intended to signal credit-worthiness by LDC governments
is often observed.

Credit on international markets is typically

quantity-rationed, with countries having higher rates of saving and investment
receiving larger loans at lower rates of interest.
Because lenders are often unable to obtain legal remedies for breach of
contract in a debtor's political jurisdiction, mutually advantageous contracts
common in domesttc corporate bond-finance are unenforceable in the
international credit market.

In the presence of sovereign risk, lenders must

rely upon the threatened denial of future credits and the disruption of a

debtor's commodity trade or access to trade-finance to discourage the
repudiation of debt.

In the case of corporate finance, bond covenants and

bankruptcy provisions protect creditors from increases in their exposure to
default risk created by subsequent borrowing by their debtors.

When these

contracts are unenforceable, lenders possess imperfect information about the
future total debt service obligations of borrowers.
In the model, production is stochastic and debtors maximize the
discounted stream of their expected utility from consumption in each period
under the constraint that a default leads to the denial of all future credit,
and

creditors maximize expected profits.

This model is similar to one

· developed by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a) to demonstrate quantity-rationing of
credit in a deterministic setting (they also discuss the model with stochastic
income).

This paper extends their work by defining and examining the

properties of competitive equilibria in loan contracts under alternative
assumptions about the information possessed by creditors.

AsylTlfTletries of

;~formation about total concurrent indebtedness of borrowers between debtors
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and creditors are shown to imply the shortened debt maturity structures,
predominance of bank over bond lending, relationship between
quantity-ra tioning of credit and rates of investment, and exclusion of the
lowest income LDCs from the private internation al capital market observed in
LDC borrowing.

Another paper, by Sachs and Cohen (1982), explores the

relationshi p between default risk, the lack of bond covenants and the special
features of LDC borrowing.

Their approach and explanation s differ greatly

from those given in this paper, which concentrate on the role of asymmetries
of information between creditors and debtors.
The effects .of moral hazard and imperfect information on the characteris tics
of equilibrium contracts are studi.ed in a model of external borrowing.

A

sizeable and well-known literature on the consequence s of imperfect information for
market outcomes already exists.

Ideas developed in many papers on moral hazard

and insurance markets (for example, A."nott and Stiglitz (1982), Helpman and
Laffont (1975), Pauly (1974), and Shavell (1979)) are applied to the problem of
LDC borrowing with sovereign risk, and some of the results have parallels in
this literature.

The basic model is described in the next section, and the existence of
equilibrium for the model under the two alternative assumptions about lenders'
information is discussed in section 3.
equilibria under each assumption.

Section 4 considers the efficiency of

Section 5 relates the properties bf

equilibrium for the model to the stylized facts about private lending to LDCs.
The last section concludes the paper with some remarks about debt reschedulin g
in the model.
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2.

The Basic Model

This secti on develops the basic model of inter natio
nal lending with
defa ult risk . In cont rast to a model of domestic
cred it markets, lend ers face
sove reign risk: borrowers can repu diate all thei r
debt . Because
non-repayment of loans would be optimal for the borro
wer in any reali zed state
of natu re if no pena lty were imposed, lend ers are
assumed to exclude a
defa ulter from acce ss to any futur e loan s. This stron
g ince ntive devi ce
induces repayment in some state s of natu re and defa
ult in othe rs (Sti glitz and
Weiss {1980) thoroughly discu ss the use of this ince
ntive ). Although the
resch edul ing of debt is not an allowed alter nati ve
in the basic model, under
certa in addi tiona l assumptions, resch edul ing is a
pref erred alter nati ve to
repu diati on for both lend ers and borrowers in some
state s of the worl d.
In this model, loans can be inter pret ed as imports
of capi tal goods which
cannot be curr ently consumed. All loans are assum
ed to be inve sted and
capi tal lasts only one perio d.I Output from a given
amount of borrowing is a
random varia ble and is obtained one perio d afte r inves
tments are made. This
assumption is a simp lifyi ng one which allows an easi
ly solv able dynamic
programming problem and can be relaxed to allow borro
wers to choose between
consumption and investment of loan prin cipa ls.
Borrower Behavior

. Al.

The following assumptions char acte rize borrowers:
Net output in each perio d is a random vari able , Yt,

which incre ases with

the quan tity of borrowing from abroad, bt-1 · The
state of natu re is
·cha racte rized by a random varia ble, Zt, a scal ar
defin ed over the unit
inte rval , and the Zt's are independently iden tical
ly distr ibut ed. Net
output is a func tion of bt-1 and Zt, such that
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Yt = y(b t-1, Zt), ~y
labt -1

2
> 0, ay

2 < 0
labt -1

and ay/a zt > 0.

We also assume that y(0, zt} > 0 and that ay;a
bt-1
vanishes as bt-1 approaches infi nity .

A2. Output is not stor able , so that curr ent cons
umption, Ct, equ als curr ent

A3.

net output minus deb t-se rvic e payments.
The borrower's obje ctiv e func tion at time vis
EVv

=

.,
E[ r atu( ct+v )J
t=0

where U(c) is a con tinu ousl y twic e-di ffer enti
able feli city func tion and
U' > 0, U" < 0, and 0 < 8 < 1.
The two following assumptions are adopted
rest rict ing the form of loan
con trac ts:
A4.

Debt matures in one peri od with deb t-se rvic
e obli gati ons at time (t+l )
given by R(b t). Typ ical ly, R(bt) = (l+r )bt•

A5.

In each peri od, the borrower sele cts ari amou
nt of loan s, bt, with
deb t-se rvic e obli gati ons , R(b t), from thos e
offe red by lend ers. If
repayments fall below deb t-se rvic e obli gati
ons in any peri od, furt her
loans will not be fort hcom ing.

The last assumption may be obje cted to on
the basi s that defa ulte rs are
not excluded from access to inte rnat iona l
cred it markets forevermore.
However, a moratorium on futu re lending of
fini te dura tion to defa ulte rs or
the pos sibi lity of resc hed ulin g at a cost
to the pote ntia l defa ulte r will have
the same qua lita tive ince ntiv e to repay effe
ct. The presumption that any
insu ffic ienc y to cover deb t-se rvic e obli gati
ons in full lead s to dec lara tion
of a defu alt can be supported by the pro life
rati on of cros s-de faul t clau ses in
inte rnat iona l loan con trac ts. A cros s-de faul
t clau se allows othe r lend ers to
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declare all their loans to a borrower in default after one lender declare s a
defaul t in an effort to cover its losses out of the horrow er's assets in
countr ies in which the lender 's lien would be recognized.

The exclusi on fron

future partici pation in the credit market is the only cost to rlefaul t in the
basic model. Additio nal costs, such as denial of trade credits or retalia tory
interfe rence with trade will only enhance the incenti ve to repay.
Under the above assump tions, optimal debtor behavior for any given amount
of borrowing and repayment obliga tions can·be describ ed. The borrow er's
utility in the state of nature Zt is, under defaul t,
(1)

In the event of repayment, it is
(2)

vr(bt-1 ,R(bt~ 1),Zt) = U(y(bt -1,Zt) - R(bt-1) )
+ SE max {Vr(bt ,R(bt), Zt+l), yd(bt,Z t+1)}.

Defaul t is optimal in any realize d state of the world, Zt, such that
yd(bt- 1,Zt) > vr(bt-1,R(bt-1),zt) ■

Because utility is increas ing and concave and net output is increas ing in
I
Zt, if defaul t is optimal for some state zt'
it is optimal for all Zt less

than z~, and conver sely for repayment.

Theref ore, there exists a ,state, it,

such that defaul t occurs for all Zt less than it and repayment for all Zt
greate r than it. The probab ility of repayment is
(3)

1

P(b,R(b )) = _JdF(z ), where F(z) is
z

the cumula tive distrib ution functio n for

the choice of P(b,R(b )) will be unique .

Zt ■

- need not be unique,
Although Zt
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This paper is concerned with the properties of equilibrium for this model
of international borrowing.

Because both debtors and creditors seek to solve

their same respective maximization problems every period until default occurs
(the lenders' objective functions are defined below), equilibrium will entail
a stationary state, in which the debt-service obligation schedule is constant

across periods and each borrower obtains the same amount of loans in every
period prior to default.
occurs in equiliQrium.

This will be true whether or not quantity rationing
Therefore, a characterization of equilibrium requires

an understanding of how default behavior varies with a stationary (until

default actually takes place) quantity of loans and debt-service obligations.
Because the utility function is concave and the proctuction function is
monotone increasing in z, the optimal choice of P(b,R(b)) is given by
maximizing expected utility with respect to i, under the assumption that the
loan contract, (b,R(b)), is available e,ery period prior to default (time
subscripts will be suppressed for the remainder of this paper because all
quantities will take their stationary state values).

z,

repayment can be found by determining the state,

The probability of
for which the

following expression for expected utility is maximizect: 2

-

-

Z

(4)

EV(b,R(b),z)

=

0

Z

JU(y(b,z))dF

1
+

jU(y(b,z)-R(b)}dF

-

z

+

+

C

1

JdF· I: et JU(y(O,z))dF
O
t=l
O

1
B}dF•EV(b,R(b),i), or

z-

( 5)

EV(b,R(b),z)

=

[ J5(y (b,z) )dF + _JG (y (b,z )-R( b) }dF+( 1:J ~F) - 1~8 JG(y (O,z) }dF]
0
z
z
O
•
(1 - 8 JdF)
z-
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If F{z) is continuous over the unit inte rval ,
then EV(b,R{b),z) is continuous
and diff eren tiab le in z (als o, in ban d r for
R(b) = (l+r )b) and atta ins a
maximum over the unit inte rval for any loan con
trac t. The firs t-or der
cond ition for an inte rior maxi mum of ( 5) over
z is
(6)

~[

-

0

1

1
]
J~(y (b,z) )dF+ _JU (y(b ,z)-R {b)) dF- JU(y
(O,z))dF

z

=

(1-f P(b, R(b ))]·

0

[U(y (b,i) )-U( Y(b ,z)-R (b)) J •
Since 1/(1-BP)

...

r (~P) t, an inte rpre tatio n of this expr essio n is that
t=O
the expected di~counted value of not defa ultin
g in the stat e of natu re z
equa ls the curr ent loss in util ity in stat e i
from repayment of the loan . The
seco nd-o rder cond ition for a maximum over z is
easi ly checked for continuous
F{z) and holds at i sati sfyi ng (6). The maximization
of expected util ity with
resp ect to defa ult beha vior is strai ghtf orw ard
for disc ount inuo us F(z) , and
expe cted util ity under optimal defa ult behavior
is continuous in the quan tity
lent and rate of inte rest charged when R(b) =
(l+r )b. Furt herm ore, P(b, r) =
P(b, (l+r )b) is continuous in both ban d r if F(z)
is cont inuo us.
=

Lender Behavior

A6.

The following assumptions char acte rize lend ers:
lend ers are perf ect com petit ors and are risk -neu
tral,

or alte rnat ivel y,

the defa ult risk of indi vidu al debt ors is unco
rrela ted with the market
risk .
A7.

Eith er lend ers borrow depo sits at a fixe d rate
of inte rest , P, repa id
with cert aint y, or they are able to lend on
an alte rnat ive market at a
cert ain rate of retu rn, P. We may assume that
pis fixe d, or that it is
determined com peti tive ly where ther e is an upw
ard-sloping supply of
depo sits curv e.

For sim plic ity, pis taken as fixe d.3
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Each lender, i, seeks to maximize its expecteci profit, given by:
En;

(7)

=

b; (l+r)P(b, r) - b; (l+o), where b is the total borrowing

by

each debtor anci b; is the amount lent by lender i.
3.

Equilibriu m
In this section, equilibri a are compared for the alternate assumptions

about lenders' informati on.

In the first of these, creditors are unable to

observe the total amount of loans contracte d by any debtor in a given period.
They only know the amounts of loans they provide each borrower.

The second

assumption is that creditors observe the total lending to any borrower each
period.

4

Competitive equilibriu m for the model under each assumption is defined as
a Nash equilibriu m in loan contracts .

Equilibriu m will occur when no new loan

can be offered which achieves non-negative expected profits, contingen t upon
the lender's information about total indebtedn ess, and is preferred by a
borrower to the contracts offered.

In the remainder of this paper, a loan

contract will be the pair (b,r), where bis total single period borrowing by a
represent ative debtor (all borrowers are alike throughout this section).

The

total current outstandin g debt of a given borrower may be composed of loans
from several lenders, but perfect competiti on implies that the rate of
interest charged by each will be the same. 5
3.1

Equilibriu m Without Observab ility of Total Indebtedness
If each lender is incapable of observing the total borrowing by a debtor

in ~ach period, then the loan contracts can only specify the rate of interest
and the size of that loan and not the total simultaneous indebtedn ess of the
borrower.

Because the probabili ty of repayment depends upon the total debt

due at a given date for each borrower~ a lender can.only know the probabili ty

10

of repayment when a borrower's excess demand for loans is non-positiv e at the
market rate of interest (we presume throughout that dehtors 1 objective
functions are known to creditors).

When lenders are unable to observe total

borrowing, debtors with different concurrent indebtednes s cannot be
distinguish ed.

Therefore, if an equilibrium exists, it must occur along the

demand curve for loans; that is, the rate of interest alone can be used to
ration loans.
The demand. curve for loans is derived by maximizing expected utility with
respect to both the probability of repayment and the quantity of loans for
eac~ period prior to a default, taking as given the rate of interest.

If the

solution for maximizing with respect to repayment choice results in a
pr9bability of default of unity, demand for loans will be infinite.

For rates

of interest at which expected utility is maximize_d through this behavior, the
demand curve is not defined.

These will be high rates of interest, and for

the general model, there will exist finite solutions to the maximization
problem for interest rates below some limit.

The borrower prefers to receive

this size loan during every period until a state of nature is realized for
which default is optimal at the given rate of interest to receiving a larger
loan resulting in a higher optimal probability of defaulting and receipt of no
future loans.
The first-order conditions for the loan demand curve are (6) and
. (8)

cl[V

T

= 0,

or

J~'(y(b,z)) ay(b,z) dF +
O
db

J~
2

1

(y(b,z)-(l+ r)b) /dy(b,z) - (l+r~dF

\

db

1

=

0
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The second-order conditions for a maximum are given in the Appendix, where it
is also proved that satisfaction of the second-order conditions implies a
downward sloping demand curve.

If F(z) is somewhere discontinuous in the unit

interval, then loan demand may not be continuous in the interest rate;
although it is continuous for cohtinuous F(z).
Since default is possible, debtors desire to borrow an amount at·~ given
rate of interest given by equation (8).

This implies that the expected

- marginal utility of the last unit of capital borrowed over states of the world
for which repayment occurs is negative:

;it• (y(b,z)-(l+r)b)

(ayl~•z) - (l+r~dF < 0

Therefore, borrowers demand more capital than they would if default were
"}impossible, and if demand is satisfied, capital will be employed beyond the
point of equality of its marginal productivity and marginal cost.•
Because debtors.choose optimally in which states of nature to repudiate
their debts, the expected profits of lenders need not rise with either
· increasing rates of interest or quantity lent.

The probability of repayment

always declines with an increase in the rate of interest (holding loan
'quantity fixed) and, except possibly for small total borrowing, with an
increase in indebtedness at a constant interest rate (along the demand curve
the

partial derivative of the repayment probability with respect to bis

negative).

These results are given in the Appendix.

Furthermore, the

probability of repayment goes to zero for large enough b, so that the
following proposition holds:
PROPOSITION 1:

Given assumptions Al-AS, the set of pairs, (b,r), in the

·positive orthant such that expected profits are non-negative is bounded from
below and on the right.

If the marginal pr9ductivity of loans {capital) is

bounded at zero in all states of nature, then this set is bounded above for
all positive b.
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The set of loan contracts (pairs (b, r)) for which expected profits
are non-negative is depicted in Figures land 2.

A demand curve for loans in

the rate of interest is also in.dicated.
The proposition can be illustrated by a simple example.

If we let

U(c) = c, then maximization of expected utility, equation (5), with respect
to

z

gives the following first-order conditions for corner solutions:

1

(9)

B J(y(b,z)-y(O,z))dF.
0

Therefore, default is certain for all b for rates of interest greater than~.
where

r

is given by:

·1 +

-r = ual BJ
b+o b

:(y (b, z) - y (o, z))dF

=BJ:

ax.l~'bz)
u

I

, b=o

dF.

Also, for strictly concave production functions, there always exists a finite
value of b for any r > -1 such that

i is unity.

The traditional textbook model of the loan market assumes that any
borrower is able to obtain all the loans they desire at a parametric rate of
interest and equilibrium results when the market clears at a given rate of

r

E

ir

)

0

D

b

Figure

l

r

E n

;;i

O

D

b

Figure~
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intere st.

Such an equili brium can be called an intere st rate equili brium .

Because the total concu rrent indebtedness of differ ent borrowers cannot
be
distin guishe d, an equili brium without observ ability must occur on the
demand
curve. If an equili brium exists , it must be an intere st rate equili brium
,
since the intere st rate alone can be used to ration loans.
Because the set of loan contra cts for which expected profit s are
non-ne gative is bounded on the right, an equili brium without observ ability
need not exist; there need not be any point- on the demand curve for which
expected profit s are at least zero.
Figures 1 and 2 illust rate the existe nce and nonexistence of equili bria
withou t observ ability , respec tively . Point A of Figure 1 is an equili
brium
withou t observ ability because no loan contra ct more prefer red by borrow
ers {at
a lower rate of intere st) can be offere d which provid es non-negative
profit s.
In Figure 2, the set of contra cts for which expected profii s ~re non-ne
gative
lies entire ly to the left of the demand curve arn at no rate of intere
st will
l=nder s offer a marke t-clea ring quanti ty of loans.

There fore, no equili briun,

exists .
The set of equili bria withou t observ ability and the set of intere
st
rate equili bria are identi cal. For this to hold, a specia l case
of intere
rate equilib rium must be ruled out.

st

If the demand curve of Figure 2 inters ected

the vertic al axis, then an intere st rate equili brium would result
at
that point, since both supply and demand at that rate of intere st
would
equal zero.

Such a point would not be an equili brium withou t observ ability

becaus e there are loans which can be offere d at lower rates of intere
st
.that achiev e positi ve expect ed profit s (the point is not a Nash
equili brium
·1n loan contra cts).

This type of intere st rate equili brium will not

occur, becaus e if the demand curve inters ected the vertic al axis,
any
borrow er would increa se their utilit y by demanding any quant it
and defaul ting with certai nty at that rate of intere st.

of loans

Loan demand
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would not be defined at such a rate of interest, so that the demand

curve will never intersect the vertical axis.
The above arguments can be summarized as:

PROPOSITION 2:

Without observab ility by lenders of total concurren t

indebtedn ess of borrowers , equilibriu m may fail to exist.

If it does exist, equili

brium without observab ility is equivalen t to the interest rate equilibriu m.
The existence or non-exist ence of an equilibriu m provides no informati on
about the dynamics of contractin g; nothing can be inferred about disequilib rium
trading.

Even if an equilibriu m without observab ility fails to exist, loan

contracts which achieve positive expected profits generally exist (as in Figure 2).
If-no other lender offers credit, any particula r creditor can provide a loan

contract with positive expected profits, so that a no lending equilibriu m does
not exist, either.

Non-exist ence of an equilibriu m does not imply that dis

equilibriu m lending will not occur.

3.·2

Equilibriu m with Observab ility of Total Indebtedn ess

If lenders are able to observe the total borrowing by debtors at each
date, then loan contracts specifyin g the rate of interest to be paid as a

function of total current borrowing are possible.

Competiti ve lenders will

only offer contracts which achieve non-negat ive expected profits.

A

competiti ve (Nash) equilibriu m will occur when no further contract can he
offered to borrowers which achieves non-negativ~ expected profits and is
chosen by the borrower over another contract already offered.

The existence of a competiti ve equilibrum with observab ility of total
concurren t borrowing can be proven for the model.

Preferenc es over loan

contracts are given by maximizing expected utility over the probahili ty of
repayment and ranking contracts using the expected utility of contracts with

15

the optimal choice of default behavior.

This resulting function (an envelope)

is continuous for continuous felicity and production functions, although
concavity of these functions does not assure concavity of expected utility
with optimal default behavior (for example, it generally will not be if F(z)

is not everywhere continuous in [0,1]).
THEOREM:

An equilibrium with observabili ty exists for the model if F(z)

is continuous on [0,1].

This equilibrium is equivalent to an equilibrium in

exclusive loan contracts (i.e., each borrower can select only one contract
each period and lenders are competitive )
PROOF:

Let X be the set of loan contracts, (b, r), in the positive

orthant which achieve non-negativ e expected profits.
and on the right.

Xis bounded from below

If F(z) is continuous everywhere on [O, 1), then P (b, r)

is continuous in (b, r), so expected profits, En, are continuous over the
positive orthant.

Therefore, Xis closed.

For any quantity of loans, b,

borrowers prefer contracts at lower rates of interest, so that expected utility
will be greatest over the lower and righthand boundaries of X.

a maximum

Therefore,

of EV over X exists.

An equilibrium with observabili ty is depicted in Figure 3.

The curve

denoted, EVo, is an indifference curve over loan contracts under optimal
default behavior.

Expected utility increases in a downward and outward

direction, and each indifference curve will be tangent to a horizontal line at

the demand curve because expected utility is maximized there for each rate of
interest if there is no constraint on the availabilit y of credit.

Equilibrium

occurs at point A in Figure 3.

An equilibrium with observahili ty will typically entail credit rationing.
Equilibrium contracts occur inside the demand curve, except in a special case

,·

r

E

ir

)

0

EVo

b

Figure

l

f
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(when the locus of loan contracts providing zero expected profits has zero
slope where it crosses the demand curve).

In this instance, equilibria with

and without observabili ty coincide.

The condition that F(z} be continuous over the unit interval assured that
the set of loan contracts for which expected profits were non-negativ e was
closed.

If F(z) is discontinuo us (for example, if only a discrete set of

~tates of the world occurred with positive probability ), then this set need
not be closed.

Because there can be contracts for which two different

probabiliti es of repayment yield equal reward to the borrower (the debtor can
be indifferent between repaying and defaulting in a particular one of a
-discrete set of states occurring with positive probability ), expected profits
are not well-defined at some contracts.

Even though expected utility with

optimal default behavior is continuous, so that indifferenc e curves are
continuous, they are not necessarily concave and the demand curve is generally
discontinuo us.

Therefore, neither type of equilibrium may exist without
continuity of F(z). 6
3.3

Efffciency of Equilibrium
Equilibria with and without observabili ty are depicted in Figure 4.

The

equilibrium Without observabili ty is at Point A, and the one with
observabili ty, at B. The curve EVo and EV1 are indifferenc e curves over loan
contracts after maximization with respect to default-repa yment choice.
Because an equilibrium with ohservahili ty is a contract which maximizes
expected utility over the subset of contracts for which expected profits are
non-negativ e, it cannot be Pareto-dominated by an equilibrium without
observabili ty, if one exists, since this latter contract must be in the same
subset of the plane.

If the supply curve of deposits is upward-sloping, then

r

E ,r ) O

D

b

Figure

~
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the market -clearin g certain rate of interes t may be lower with observ ability .
The set of loan contrac ts which provide non-ne gative expected profits will
enlarg e, and borrowers' expected utility will further increas e.
Under the assumptions of the model, an equilib rium with observ ability is
a constrained-optimum for both lenders and borrow ers. A constrained-optimum
1s defined as an allocat ion such that no agent's welfare can be improved
withou·t decreas ing that of anothe r given the allocat ions achieva ble with the
contra cts and information availab le. That is, debtor s make their optimal
choice between repayment and default under the equilib rium loan contrac t in
each state of nature. This choice is mad e~~. after the state is

revealed.
PROPOSITION 3:

Under the assumptions of the model, an equilib rium with

observ ability of total concur rent indebte dness is a constrained-optimum.
lf other markets are conside red, this result may no longer hold.

The

move from one type of equilib rium to the other may induce changes in
the

interna tional prices of commodities, leading to net welfare reducti ons for
some debtor countr ies.
The failure of efficie ncy of equilib rium withou t observ ability arises
becau~e lenders are unable to restric t the quanti ty of loans provided each
borrower at a given rate of intere st.

An individ ual lender does not

interna lize the fu11 effect on the probab ility of repayment of debt of an
increas e in the amount he lends to a given debt"or. At a given rate of
intere st, the size loan which maximizes the first credit or's profits will
genera lly be less than the total amount of loans which achieve non-ne gative
expecte d profits •. This precun iary extern ality leads to the failure of
efficie ncy.
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Implications for LDC Borrowing j_!)_ Private Credit Markets

4.

Properties of equilibria for the model under the asylTlfTletries of
information which result from the absence of bond covenants establishing
bankruptcy provisions and restricting debt dilution imply many of the
differences between LDC and domestic corporate borrowing.

The shortening of

the maturity structure of debt, predominance of bank over bond lending,

quantity rationing of credit, and redlining of the poorest LDCs are considered
below.
4.1

Shortening of Oebt Maturities
With longer-lived capital and multiple debt maturities, the results of

the_ previous sections imply that the lack of enforceable constraints on debt

dilution in international
lending leads to an equilibrium
with debt of short
.
.
maturities.

Between the negotiation and maturation of long-term debt,

information about the ultimate repayment ability of a borrower is usually
revealed.

Providers of sho~ter term loans which mature concurrently with

long-term debt are more informed about the profitability of lending to
particular debtors.

Without enforceable contracts restricting subsequent

borrowing and establishing debt priorities in the event of bankruptcy, these
asymmetries of information can lead to the observed short maturity structure
of LDC borrowing.
Suppose that a loan which matures in two periods and provides zero
expected profits is made and that after one period, it is known whether

realized output will be in a lower or an upper portion of its range.

In the

former case, the expected profits on the two-period loan and on any one-period
loan which matures at the same date are negative after the information is
revealed.
6,

In the latter case, there are one-period loan contracts which

,ieve non-negative expected profits.

When subsequent equilibrium one-period
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loans are correctly anticipat ed, the original two-period loan provide~
negative expected profits.

Therefore , the set of longer term loan contracts

which achieve non-negative expected profits is a subset of what it would be

in the presence of bond covenants.

Because the set of loan contracts which

provide non-negative expected profits is bounded from above in the rate of
interest, the rate of interest on longer term debt cannot necessari ly be
raised in order to attain positive expected profits.

For this reason, the set

of long-term loan contracts achieving non-negative expected profits may be
empty.

With increasin g debt maturitie s, this possibili ty becomes more

1 i kely.
Another possible reason long maturity debt is not observed is indicated
by the above observati ons.

As noted by Sachs and Cohen (1982), a long-term

loan contract would require a higher rate of interest for a given size loan
than a shorter term contract to achieve non-negative profits.

Borrowers may

prefer debt of shorter maturitie s at lower rates of interest, so that
long.:term loan contracts do not occur in a competiti ve e_quilibrium.

However,

their model presumes that the interest rate can always be increased to achieve
non-nega tive expected profits.
A natural way to endogenize debt maturitie s is to use a neoclassi cal

growth model with stochasti c technology and optimal saving (with sovereign
risk, this type of model is analytica lly troubleso me; see footnote I).

Because the probabili ty of future repayment of debt will depend upon the
current capital endowment, providers of short maturity debt will possess
better informati on about this probabili ty than lenders of longer maturity debt
{due concurren tly).

Unfortuna tely, with multiple maturitie s of debt, the

stochasti c dynamic programming problem will no longer be Markovian.
of any loan contract will depend upon the entire history of capital

The terms
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accumulation back to the issue of the oldest unsettled debt, so that
determination of a stochastic equilibrium would be extremely combersome,
if possible.

An

alternative way to demonstrate the effects of sovereign risk

on debt maturities is to allow capital to last two periods in the basic
model and consider debt which matures after either one or two periods.
If partial information is available in any period about what state of
nature will prevail in the next, then lenders of debt which matures
in one-period wil.). be better informed about the expected profits of
various loan contracts than will lenders of debt maturing in two periods.
This extension of the basic model is presented using an example in the
Appendi_x.
~-2

Predominance of Bank Lending
In the absence of enforceable contracts limiting simultaneous debt of

equal priority or establishing compensation procedures in the event of default,
a bond market in LDC debt is unable to provide lenders with observability

of the total concurrent indebtedness of individual borrowers.

The analysis

of the existence and efficiency properties of equilibria with and
without observability demonstrates the benefits to lenders of observing
total debt-service obligations.

If the market achieves an equilibrium

without observability and some creditor is able to restrict the total
current borrowing of a particular debtor, then there exists a loan
contract which provides both positive expected profits to the lender
and a higher expected utility for the debtor than attained with that
equilibrium contract.

Therefore, whether or not a bond market equili-

brium exists, creditors have an incentive to achieve observability of
total concurrent indebtedness.

While lending through bonds does
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not accommodate observa tion of each debtor's total borrowin g, bank lending
with disclosu re of amounts can allow creditor s to obtain this informa tion.

Lenders' efforts to acquire informa tion about the charact eristics
of individu al borrower s have been widely recogniz ed; however, in the
model, each lender knows the utility and producti on function s of every
debtor (the relation ship between the probabi lity of repayment and all
current loan contrac ts for each borrowe r is known).

Of special importan ce

for LDC borrowin g on private credit markets is informa tion about total
borrowin g.

Bank lending is predomi nant becau~e, unlike bondhol ders,

interme diaries have the ability to restric t simultan eous debt-ser vice
obligati ons by informin g each other of the terms of their individu al
lo~s to any given debtor.

The model demonst rates that each lender

has an incentiv e to reveal this informa tion to every other lender.

In addition to the predominance of bank lending, these comparisons also
explain the octurren ce of consortium lending to the LOCs. If each borrower is

able to obtain a loan from only one source {a consortium) each period, a
competi tive equilibr ium in such loan contrac ts will be achieved with each
borrowe r's most preferre d contract within the set of ones which provide
non-neg ative expected profits.

This is exactly the same set of equilib ria

(since equilibr ium loans are possibly not unique) as that achieved with
observa bility of total concurrent indebted ness.
In the model, borrowers repay loans in some states of nature because they
are denied all future access to credit in the event of a default . The
enforcement of this incentiv e mechanism, as similar ones which allow
debt-res chedulin g and further credit, requires coopera tion between potentia l
lenders . Such cooperation is easier to attain the smaller the number of
credito rs and may be impossible to achieve with bond-fin ance.

Because the

possible denial of short-te rm trade-fi nance will increase thE .~st of
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defaul ting to a borrower, banks which provide such finance will face lower
probab ilities of default for the same loan contrac ts as will other lenders .
Theref ore, the predominance of bank over bond lending may result because of
the ability of interm ediarie s to cooperate and impose stronge r repayment
incent ives, as well as to exchange information at lower cost.
4.3

Quanti ty-ratio ning of_ Credit

The solutio n of the model with observ ability of concur rent indebtedness
demonstrates how the threat of debt repudia tion leads to the
quanti ty-rati oning of credit.

In the case of domestic corpor ate finance ,

enforce able bond convenants·and bankruptcy provisi ons which provide this
tnform ation to credito rs allow a market in corpor ate bonds to exist, so that,
in genera l, the interes t rate alone rations credit .

The exchange of

inform ation between financi al interm ediarie s and short maturi ty structu res
which increas e observ ability in the presence of defaul t risk have the
opposi te effect in LDC borrowing, leading to quanti ty~rati oning.
In the above section s, station ary state equilb ria are describ ed for the
model under the assumption that all borrowed funds are investe d. The model
can be rewritt en to allow debtors to choose between the consumption and

investm ent of loans they receive .

Allowing consumption out of current

borrowing reduces the probab ility of repayment for each loan contra ct.
Debtors with lower rates of discoun t can be shown to optima lly select higher

rates of investment resulti ng in an outward shift in the locus of loan
contra cts for which expected profits vanish and an inward shift in their
demand curves for loans.

Theref ore, in an equilib rium with observ ability ,

these borrowers receive larger loans with probably lower rates of interes t and
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are ratione d less severel y than borrowers with lower propen sities to invest.
This result coincides with the observ ation that interna tional differe nces in

savings -invest ment rates and availab le investment opport unities lead to
signifi cant variati ons in the amount of lending to differe nt countr ies, along
with variati ons in risk premia charged.
4.4

[xclusi on of Lowest-income LDCs from the Private Capita l Market
The model can also explain the·exc lusion of the lowest-income countr ies

from access to loans on private interna tional credit market s.

If investment

possib ilities (that is, the production functio n, y(b,z) ) vary across
countr ies, the highest expected rate of return on any ·1oan to some countr ies
can be lower than the expected rates of return on many loans to other
countr ies. Then~ for an upward-sloping supply of deposi ts schedu le, the
expecte d rate of return for which the loan market is in equilib rium and the
quanti ty lent equals the supply of deposi ts forthcoming at that rate can be
greate r than the maximum attaina ble rate of return on any loans to some
countr ies (this explan ation is simila r to one given by Stiglit z and Weiss
(1981} ).

5.

Conclusion

Although actual defaul ts may occur rarely, the threat of debt
repudi ations signifi car1tly affect market outcomes for LDC borrowing.

The

propertie~ of equilib ria with and without obser~ ability of the total
concur rent indebtedness of borrowers by lenders imply many of the observed
differe nces between interna tional lending and domestic corpor ate finance .
partic ular, asymmetries of inform ation in the model of lending with moral
hazard are shown to imply the lack of bond lending and short maturi ties of

debt in this market.

In
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The rescheduling of LDC debt has not been addressed in this paper.
Instead, repayment on schedule and default are the only options available
to debtors.

A proper inclusion of rescheduling in this type of model would

be to derive the optimal strategy for lenders endogenously.

While debt

rescheduling is superior to default for lenders and could be combined with the
availability of future credit to induce debtors not to default, the possibility
of res:heduling will also reduce incentives to invest and repay debts on schedule.
Particular forms of rescheduling have been introduced into the model which
expand the set of contracts which creditors can offer (a contract then includes
a specification of rescheduling op~ortunities).

Because the original full set of

contracts providing non-negative expected profits can still be offered (these
involve no rescheduling), a Nash equilibrium contract in the larger set will be
preferred by debtors and achieve non-negative expected profits.
In the model, debts are repaid with positive probability because every
creditor refuses to lend to a past defaulter.

A moratorium on future lending to

defaulters is not achievable as a Nash equilibrium.

If every other creditor

observes such a moratorium for some number of periods, then any particular lender
can offer a profitable loan contract to a recent defaulter since the incentive to
repay is still enforced by other creditors.
even at a moratorium length of zero:

A Nash equilibrium fails to exist

when no other lending occurs, any creditor

will want to be the sole lender because they can enforce their own moratoria•
The debtor behavior described in section 2 can be modified trivially for the
case of finite length moratoria.

Although an increase in the length of the

moratoria reduces the probability of default, by increasing the time that any

potential borrower in default is excluded from the market, the net effect can be
a reduction in the average number of actual borrowers present at any time.
A credito~ optimal cooperative equilibrium in debt moratorium length with perfect

competition in loan contracts can be determine~ ··,y maximizing the expectation of
profits with respect to this length,
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Appendix
Comparative Statics of Debtor Behavior
The first-o rder conditi ons for a maximum of expected utility at a given
rate of interes t for continuous F(z) are

(20)

0
:V

az

= 0,

= B[A{b,r,z)

or (1-BP)•6U(b,r,i)

( 21 )

clEV
,i)
ab -_ 0 , or aA(b,r
ob

where

1
P = _JdF{z),

=

- EUo]

O

z
fl U( b,

r~

z) = U(y ( b, z)) - U(y ( b, z) - (1+ r) b)
z

1

A(b,r,z ) = JU(y(b,z))dF + jU(y(b,z) - (l+r)b)dF,
0

EUo

·

i

1

JU (y (0, z) )dF.

=

0

The second-order conditi ons evalua ted at a point satisfy ing the first-o rder
conditi ons are:

(22)

a2Ev
---

az2

(1-BP )-1 cl 6U f ( z ) < 0,
az

(23)

--=

a2Ev
ab2

(l-BP)-1 a2A < 0, and
.
ab2

-
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(24)

- = dz
dF evaluated at z.
> 0, where f(z)
For concave U(c) and y(b,z) in b, (22} and (23) are satisfied because
(25)

atU

ai

= [U'(y(b,z }) - U'(y(b,z) - (l+r}b}] .!Q. f(z) < 0,

ai

-

2

(26)

2

2

1

2
~ =- JU'(y(b,z )) ~ dF + _JU'(y(b,z} - {l+r)b) •~
dF

ab2

o

.<

Equation

(24)

ab2

z

-

ab2

o.

is equivalen t to

a2A a2A a2A
- - - - > o.
3b2 az2

obdz

Therefore, satisfacti on of the second-order conditions is equivalen t to
concavity of A(b,r,z) at a point where (20} and (21) hold.
If F(z} is not continuous, maxima of EV still exist over

z and

b.

For

example, if only finite z occur with positive probabili ty, expected utility is
given by:
(27}

EV= 1f(z;)vr( b,r,z;) + 4f(Zj)Vd(b,Zj),
;

J
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where f(z;) = probabili ty of state i, and i ranges over states
of repayment and j ranges over states of default.
The first-ord er condition for maximization with respect to bis
(28)

v(z1) [u"(y(b,z ;) - (l+r)b)

(* -

(l+r~]

+ j1(Zj) [u"(y(b,Z j))

*]

= 0,

The second-or der condition is satisfied for concave U(c) and y(b,z;) in b.
The slope of the demand curve is given by total different iation of (20)
and (21) with respect tor, which yields

(29)

(30)

where

(31)

M

ar

1
= -b _JU'(y(b, z) - (l+r)b)dF < 0,

z

{32)

~~u

= bU'(y(b,i ) - (l+r)b) > 0,
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f(i) 0"(y(b ,i)

a2

*·

U'(y(b ,i) - (l+r)b)

1

(* ·

abarA = -ZJU'(y (b,z} - (l+r}b} + bU"(y(b,z} - (l+r}b}

(l+r)~ ,

(a"$ -(l+r)~

dF.

The denominator in (29) and (30} is positiv e if the second-order

conditi ons for a maximum are fulfill ed.

Additi onally, along the demand curve

(33)

Theref ore, using (31), .(32), (33), if (30) is either positiv e or negativ e,
(29) must be negativ e. The probab ility of defaul t either rises or falls
with
increas ing r along th~ demand curve.
The effects of changes in b and r on the probab ility of repayment are
found by differe ntiatio n of (20). These are

B aA - (l-6P) o6U

(34)

ar

ar

(1-BP) a~u

>

0

'

ai
ap
so that a'r" < 0, and
(35)

~ - (1-SP)M U
ab
ob
(1-eP) atiu

ai
2
For small b, (35) can be negativ e, but for b such that !Ab= 0, f(Z) 06 U = ~
o
ob
aPabaz
will be positiv e if y(b,z) is continu ous, so that (35) is positiv e and at<
O.
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The probability of repayment is defined by

(20)

~U(b,r.,z)(l-eP)

=

for an interior solution.

6(A(b,r,i)-EUo),

0 and ay (b,z) is bounded
ob
at b=O, the quantity (y(b,z)-(l+ r)) becomes negative for large band for
Because the lim ay~~,z)

larger, for all values of z.
1

8
0

J

that

b+m

=

Since the righthand side of (2) is at most

(U{y(b,z))-U(y(O,z)))dF, for all r > -1, there exists a value for b such

z = 1 and

and P = O.

- =1

for all positive b, there exists a value for r such that z

Therefore, expected profits are negative for large enough total

concurrent lending and for large enough rates of interest, and the set of loan
contracts for which En ) 0 is bounded from the right and from above.
Extension to Allow Multiple Debt Maturities
A way to demonstrate the effect of sovereign risk on debt maturities

is to allow capital to last two periods in the bas.ic model and consider
debt which matures after either one or two periods.

Suppose that in

any period information is revealed indicating whether z for the next period
will be in the upper or lower half of the unit interval; for more than one

period ahead, the value of z is known to lie in the upper or lower half with
probabiliti es P and (1-P), respectivel y.

As in the example of section 3, let

U(c) = c, and let output be given by
Yt = y(b1,b2,zt) , where b1 is the total amount lent at t-1, and b2
is the total amount lent at t-2.
The probability of repayment in any period is given implicitly by
(16)

R = y(b1,b2,z), where R is the total of current debt-servic e
obligations .
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A conditi on analagous to (9) determines pairs of loan contrac ts for which

defaul t is certain .

Equilib rium one-period maturit y loan contrac ts depend upon the total
amount lent the period before (regard less of matura tion), the terms of
two-period debt due.at the same date, and the information reveale d about the
value of z at maturi ty.

Given the terms of loans made the previou s period ,

the expected profits for the two one-pe riod contrac ts are:
(17)

h1

=

1

(l+q)b 1
z

(18)

I

Ewl

= (l+ri)b i

]dF - (l+p)b 1, and

1
"2"
]dF' - (l+p)b i, where z- and i' are given by (16).

z'

Expected profits for a two-period loan (b2,r2) are:

(19)

E•2 = (l+r2)2 b2

~-,J!F

1
+ (1-P)

,~!F) -

(l+o) 2b2.

For large enough repayment obliga tions for the two-period loan, i' will equal
•
1/2 and b I will
be zero.
2
Since increas ing the rate of interes t reduces the probab ility of

repayment (and eventu ally assures defaul t), expected profits for two-pe riod
debt may always be negative for positiv e loan amounts even though one-pe riod
loan contra cts achieve non-negative expected profits .
Because the probab ility of repayment of two-period loans is a fractio n of
that· for subsequent one-period debt, there exist concave produc tion fJnctio ns
such that conditi on (16) is satisfi ed for either one-period loan contra cts,
these contra cts achieve zero expected profits , and at the intere st rate
maximizing two-period expected profits , these profits are negativ e.
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Footno tes
l.

The assump tion that capital lasts only one period is a greatly simplif ying

one.

A model with capital accumu lation and optima l savings with soverei gn

risk has been studied .

In that model, capita l accumu lation is stocha sticall y

optima l with foreign borrowi ng until a defaul t occurs (an expecte d utility
maximi zing decisio n); during a lending morato rium, savings is chosen
optima lly withou t borrow ing.

The additio n of capita l accumu lation with

soverei gn risk does not alter the conclu sions of the presen t paper and
greatly compli cates the analys is.

2. · Altern atively , P(b, R) can be found by equatin g Vd and Vr and

for z.

The assump tions on the utility and produc tion functio ns imply

that Vd (b, z) is decreas ing in z and Vr (b, R, z) is increas ing in

z.

Theref ore, z is just the state (possib ly non-un ique) for which Vd

and vr are equal.

3.

The determ inants of the supply of funds from the develop ed (and

oil-exp orting) countr ies is outside the scope of this paper.

Althoug h

the quantit y lent to the LDCs as a whole may influen ce the deposi t rate
of intere st, other factors , especi ally the economic perform ance of the
develop ed countr ies, are primary determ inants of this rate.

The vast

. majori ty of funds lent by private interm ediarie s to the LDCs are receive
d
as interba nk deposi ts.

It is reasona ble to assume an exogenous supply

of deposi ts in the expecte d rate of return and that all lenders pay
the same deposi t rate.

4.

These distinc tions between compet itive equilib ria with and withou t

observ ability are made in the importa nt study of moral hazard in insuran ce
markets by Arnott and Stiglit z (1982).
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5.

The assumptio n that moratoria on future lending to defaulter s last

forever leads to minor algebraic simplific ation.

The effects of imperfect

inrorma~i on about concurren t debt-serv ice obligatio ns on market outcomes
appear in individua l loan contracts .

In addition to the determina tion

of equilibriu m loan contracts in the text, a descripti on of market equilibriu m

(which will be stochasti c) requires a knowledge of the distribut ion
of the number of actual borrowers (those not under moratoria ) at any
particula r time.

If the debt moratorium is of finite duration, then

a limiting distribut ion can be shown to exist if either the supply of
deposits is perfectly elastic or upward-sl oping.

In the former case,

explicit calculatio n of the distribut ion at any time is possible and
the solution to the debtor's maximizat ion problem given in section 2
only needs to be altered for the finite moratorium length (this is trivial).
In the latter· case, the limiting distribut ion cannot be given, in general,
and the.debto r's maximiza tion problem must take into account a distribut ion
over the terms of future loan contracts (because the deposit rate fluctuate s).

6.

The stochasti c model in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a) does not have

a competiti ve equilibriu m for this reason.

In their example, the set

of loan contracts which achieve non-negat ive expected profits is open.
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